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TOWARD A COMMON LAW OF ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES
J.B. RUHL*
This speech was presented on October 6, 2005, at St. Thomas
University School of Law, as part of the Distinguished Speaker Series
program. Professor Alfred Light made introductory remarks.
I have known Professor Light for many years, probably longer than
either of us would like to disclose, and have a great admiration for his
work. Thus it is my honor and privilege for his faculty and law school to
have invited me to share my work with you today.
I might add that since moving to Florida seven years ago, this is only
my second trip to the Miami area. Of course, if it had been up to my out-
of-state friends and relatives, I'd have been here many times for lunch. Not
understanding where Tallahassee is located in our state, one or another has
called to let me know they'd be in Miami later that week and maybe we
could have lunch or catch a movie. My standard response is that I'd be
happy to if they pick up the air fare.
It is fitting though, that I deliver this talk here, close to the hurricane
zone. For what I hope to do is make the case for an evolutionary move in
the common law that reflects what we are learning about ecosystems and
the economic value they provide to humans, value that has been all too
clearly illustrated in recent events by the Florida hurricanes and, of course,
Hurricane Katrina.
I will argue that the common law is poised to recognize that a
person's destruction of ecosystem structure, and thus of ecosystem
functions, can be an appropriate basis for liability in tort where the result is
to cause significant economic damage to others. This proposition runs
counter to the historical role of the common law in the context of
ecosystem conservation, which has been almost no role at all, but let me
undertake to convince you nonetheless of the important role the common
law can, and I believe will, play.
. Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law,
Tallahassee, Florida. I am thankful to the St. Thomas University School of Law for hosting me as
a Distinguished Lecturer and providing the opportunity to deliver this presentation, and to the
FSU College of Law for continued support of my research. These presentation notes are based on
an earlier version of this topic I published as J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law
of "The Fragile Land System," NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Fall 2005, at 3, to which I have made
some additional annotated comments and references. Please direct any questions or comments to
jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
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Indeed, the standard history of environmental law goes something like
this: First, there was the common law of nuisance. It worked all right for a
while at curtailing noxious uses of land, but over time things got pretty
complicated with the rise of cities, industries, and all that. Earth Day and
Rachel Carson awakened us to the ravages of pollution in an industrialized
society, but by then the courts had thrown up their hands, claiming it was
all too much for the common law to handle. State and local governments
were busy racing to somewhere called "the bottom" and did not have time
for legislative fixes, so the wise and mighty federal government took
command by enacting a horde of laws designed to stop pollution and clean
up the mistakes of the past. These laws worked like a charm for a good
while, until things got even more complicated. We began to understand the
breadth and depth of our impact on ecosystems and the landscape, and to
appreciate how puny the federal laws seemed in comparison to the
magnitude of large-scale ecological degradation. At the same time,
landowners had gotten awfully riled up over all the rules and regulations,
and said they could not stand any more of it. Thankfully, along came the
second generation of environmental laws, with smart new ideas like
pollutant trading, negotiated permits, and environmental management
systems. And we all lived happily ever after.
Now, you could find plenty of support in law books and journal
articles for this account, and just as high a stack of literature calling it into
question. But one entry finds almost universal support-that the source,
the very backbone of the wave of federal pollution control laws the federal
government enacted in the 1970s, was the common law of nuisance. And
many observers also agree that there has been a profound shift of emphasis
in environmental policy from controlling smokestacks and discharge pipes
to managing ecosystemwide phenomena such as habitat loss, invasive
species, and nutrient-laden runoff-what today goes under the umbrella
term of ecosystem management.
What is missing from this more recent focus on ecosystems and their
sensitivity to human insult, however, is any notion that legislative
initiatives might find some guidance in the framework of the common law.
How is it that the common law of nuisance is regarded as the genesis of
pollution control law, but for the law of ecosystem management it is as if
the common law never happened? In fact, the more frequent prognosis is
worse than that-it suggests that the common law simply cannot be a
factor in shaping the law of ecosystem management.
[Vol. 18
HeinOnline  -- 18 St. Thomas L. Rev. 2 2005-2006
TOWARD A COMMON LAW OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,'
Justice Scalia announced the majority's ruling that where a new regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land-in that case a
blanket prohibition of development in coastal dune areas-it must be
treated as a per se taking of property for which just compensation is due
under the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia's caveat was that just
compensation would not be due if the regulation does "no more than
[simply] duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-
by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally...."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed concern with
the idea that state regulation could go no further than duplicating the
common law of nuisance without exposing itself to the now infamous
"categorical taking" problem, for as he put it, "[c]oastal property may
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go
further in regulating its development and use than the common law of
nuisance might otherwise permit.'3 In other words, Justice Kennedy took it
as a given, as Justice Scalia and the majority also clearly did, that the
common law could not reach the "fragile land system." Indeed, although
leaving the final say to state courts, Justice Scalia surmised that "it seems
unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented erection of any
habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land.. . ." But why
not? Why not?
I will explore that question today through a proposed evolution of the
common law that is both radical and mundane. It is radical in the sense
that it challenges the deeply rooted idea that the common law has no place
in the law and policy of ecosystem management. It is mundane in the sense
that the common law doctrine proposed to start filling the gap is quite
ordinary-the law of nuisance. At bottom, therefore, it is about economic
injury, not the environment at large. It is not a charter for courts to police
the nation's biodiversity, or to restore what we believe to be some past state
of nature, or to devise and enforce broad personal rights in environmental
quality. Indeed, being based on the law of nuisance, it is grounded in terms
and concepts so familiar in the common law as to appear quite plain
vanilla.
1. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2. Id. at 1029.
3. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 1031 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
2005]
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My thesis is in three parts. The first describes the arguments usually
advanced for why the common law has not or cannot extend its reach to
include the domain of the fragile land system. I will then explore the
advances in knowledge about the management of ecosystem dynamics that
point to a severe policy failure on the horizon, and discuss reasons why
legislation has not effectively filled the void. I will close by outlining an
evolution in nuisance law based on emerging knowledge about the
economic value humans derive from healthily functioning ecosystems-
what ecologists call "ecosystem services." Though based on a
straightforward application of nuisance law, the incremental development I
am proposing for the law could jumpstart another evolution of
environmental law, this time based in the common law and devoted to
rectifying ecosystem-level harms.
THE COMMON LAW AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Several explanations have been advanced for why the common law
seems virtually irrelevant, if not impotent, in the developing policy
dialogue of ecosystem management. The first, what I call the "lack of
capacity" argument, posits that the common law is inherently inept at
addressing questions of ecosystem management. Nuisance law may have
worked well enough for controlling pollution for a while, but there is just
something about protecting ecosystems, goes the argument, that puts it
outside the domain of the common law. Under this view, it is a waste of
time to even think about how the common law can contribute to ecosystem
management.
Evidence for this view is found in none other than the history of
nuisance law in the pollution control context. Almost a century ago, the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.5
suggested that the common law could play an important and innovative role
in pollution control. After agricultural landowners in Tennessee were
unsuccessful in state court in stopping harmful air emissions from copper
smelting plants in the eastern reaches of the state, Georgia sued the
companies. Georgia's public nuisance claim against the Tennessee
companies fell on sympathetic ears in the Supreme Court. The Court was
"satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the sulphurous fumes
cause and threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the forests and
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff State" as to justify an
5. 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (awarding injunctive relief in accordance with the State's right to
prevent pollution).
[Vol. 18
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injunction.6 Indeed, in a later remedial decree, the Court, much like a
modem administrative agency, required the company to keep daily records
of its operations, to submit to court-appointed inspectors, to meet
performance standards for emission rates, and to comply with maximum
total daily emission loads.7 Although the Court later relaxed some of the
limits during wartime, ultimately the case had a technology-forcing effect
as the fear of liability led the industry to develop a new smelting process
that allowed reclamation of the sulfur.8 Now if the common law can
produce this kind of result, who needs legislation?
Alas, confidence in the common law eventually waned.
The death knell to any hopeful thinking came in 1970 in the famous
New York case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., in which New York's
highest court declined to enjoin a cement plant's air emissions, ruling
instead that a damages remedy, previously not available under New York
law, was the more efficient approach. 9 While known mostly for that shift
in remedial doctrine, the court's rationale for backing off injunctive relief
sent a loud message to legislatures that their help was needed. As the court
warned:
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on
technical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration
of the economic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect on
public health. It is likely to require massive public expenditure and to
demand more than any local community can accomplish and to depend
on regional and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private
litigation.... This is an area beyond the circumference of one private
lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and should not thus
be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property
owners ....
The date of the opinion, not coincidentally, marks the advent of the
wave of federal legislation regulating air, water, and land pollution. And
the thesis of Boomer has stuck, with courts remaining reluctant to enter into
the kind of remedial monitoring the Supreme Court evidently found
appropriate in the pollution context a century ago.' So it is no surprise that
6. Id. at 238-39.
7. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 478 (1915).
8. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 82-84 (4th ed. 2003).
9. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 228 (1970).
10. Id. at223.
11. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19964, at *21, 27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 15, 2005) (dismissing common law public nuisance claim
against power companies for allegedly having contributed to global warming, on the ground that,
20051
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law students are taught today, and I am quoting from the leading
environmental law casebook, that "there is wide agreement that private
nuisance actions alone are grossly inadequate for resolving the more typical
pollution problems faced by modem industrialized societies."' 2  Replace
"pollution" in that sentence with "ecosystem management" and one has the
lack of capacity argument in a nutshell.
The second explanation, the "lack of opportunity" argument, posits
that the common law certainly could have developed principles governing
the use and abuse of sensitive resources, but for some reason the stars did
not align in such a way as to present the opportunity. Under this view,
when the shift from pollution control to ecosystem management occurred
as a matter of policy focus, there simply was no common law tradition on
which to draw, and any legislative impetus thus must forge ahead without
using common law principles as its backbone. It is too late, in other words,
for the common law of ecosystem management to emerge.
This is the explanation often given for the underachievement of the
common law's Public Trust Doctrine. The name is impressive, suggesting
great possibilities. But the lodestar case of the Public Trust Doctrine in the
United States, at least for purposes of thinking about it as a tool of resource
conservation, was no harbinger of ecosystem management. In the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1892 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois3 opinion,
the Court held merely that Illinois could not sell fee interests in the land
under Chicago Harbor to private developers because:
[T]he state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters.... It
is a title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishinf therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties.'
Nevertheless, in his landmark 1970 Michigan Law Review article,
Professor Joseph Sax outlined an ambitious agenda for evolving the
doctrine into the nation's bedrock source of ecosystem management law.15
Sax argued that "[o]f all the concepts known to American law, only the
[P]ublic [T]rust [D]octrine seems to have the breadth and substantive
among other things, the relief sought would require the court to determine appropriate levels of
emissions, determine and apply emission reductions to the defendants, and develop a remedial
schedule).
12. PERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 72.
13. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
14. Id. at 452.
15. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
[Vol. t18
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content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for
citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource
management problems."' 6 But this never came to be.
One reason why is that the U.S. Supreme Court declined the invitation
to take the doctrine there. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the
states may not alienate fee title in tidelands, shores, and other public trust
lands in violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, and that is it. To be sure,
many state courts have opined more broadly on the scope of the Public
Trust Doctrine. In one famous case from California, regarding the
diversion of water from Mono Lake, the court ruled that "[t]he state has an
affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever
feasible.' 7 This and other state cases like it, however, are mindful of the
"publicness" of public trust resources, emphasizing uses such as
navigation, fishing, and recreation, and not necessarily preservation or even
active conservation of ecosystems.
It is true that an occasional state case suggests an ecologically
oriented purpose to the doctrine. Perhaps the most noted case in this regard
is the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Just v. Marinette
County, in which the court found that the doctrine required that wetland
areas be limited to uses consistent with "natural conditions." 18 Several
more recent cases are variations on that theme using the public trust
doctrine to protect public parks, groundwater, lakes, fish, and other water
based resources. "
Some commentators thus assert that the Public Trust Doctrine
therefore is "definitely growing" as an ecosystem management tool, to use
Arnold Lum's words. 2' By and large, however, the state courts have
16. Id. at 474.
17. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
18. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 (Wis. 1972) (quoting Turnpike Realty
Co. v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Mass. 1972)).
19. See, e.g., Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of New York, 750 N.Y.2d 1050 (N.Y.
2001) (doctrine covers public parks); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw.
2000) (doctrine covers groundwater); Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 284 (Wash.
1998) (doctrine regulates personal watercraft on state waters); Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54
(Alaska 1996) (doctrine covers fish in their natural state); Vander Bloemen v. Wisc. Dep't of Nat.
Res., No. 95-1761,1996 WL 346266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (doctrine protects lakeside ecology);
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1995) (doctrine
allows challenge to timber sales on ground that sedimentation could injure fish spawning
grounds).
20. See Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law Shaping
Environmental Policy?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Fall 2003, at 73 (quoting Pat Parenteau).
2005]
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declined to mobilize Professor Sax's vision of the Public Trust Doctrine as
a means of effective and broad judicial intervention in resource
management policy. There is, simply put, no broad-based ecosystem
management duty to be found in the judiciary's version of the Public Trust
Doctrine, certainly not one that could reach private lands on which
ecologically important resources are found.
In short, while it may be hard to detect any aversion in the case law to
expanding the Public Trust Doctrine into the domain of ecosystem
management, it is even harder to detect any sense of urgency or
enthusiasm. One rather obvious explanation for this lethargic approach is
that not long after Professor Sax suggested how the doctrine's latent power
could be tapped, the legislative revolution of the 1970s unfolded to bring
one after the other of comprehensive resource management laws into being.
New federal legislation protecting wetlands, the coastal zone, and
endangered species, as well as managing federal public lands, obviated the
need for the Supreme Court to revisit the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
eventual blossoming of similar state legislation did the same at the state
level. Maybe the Public Trust Doctrine could have become what Professor
Sax envisioned in 1970 and what many commentators still hold out hope
for, but with the surge of federal and state environmental legislation that
transpired, who needed it?
The fact that the common law can fashion innovative remedies, as the
history of Tennessee Copper suggests, and is still "growing," as the slow
evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine evidences, may support the position
that the common law actually does have the capacity and the opportunity to
move into the ecosystem management realm. But the final explanation for
why it heretofore has not moved on that front-what I call the "lack of
will" argument-is more cynical than the other two. It suggests that the
common law has the capacity to develop a set of ecologically oriented
doctrines and has had many opportunities to do so, but simply has no
advocates who wish it moves in that direction. Rather, this position
contends common law institutions have deliberately pursued anti-
environmental policies to facilitate other interests such as the protection of
property rights and promoting economic uses of land.
Evidence for this view was comprehensively assembled by law
professor John Sprankling in his 1996 Chicago Law Review Article, The
Anti-Wilderness Bias in American Property Law,2' in which he
21. John Sprankling, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519 (1996).
[Vol. 18
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systematically surveyed property law doctrines such as waste, adverse
possession, trespass, and nuisance, and argued that they were and remain
"tilted toward wilderness destruction" in order "to encourage the agrarian
development" of the nation.22 He pointed out, for example, that American
law abandoned the British version of the waste doctrine, which banned
forest clearing for cultivation, and replaced it with the view that clearing
for cultivation was "good husbandry."23 American trespass law developed
in many states so as to tolerate, if not to endorse, open grazing of livestock
on the unenclosed lands of another landowner. 24 These and other examples
of his thesis, Sprankling argued, flowed from the abundance of wilderness
America enjoyed relative to England, the need to build an economy, and
the exalted position in which Americans generally place private property
rights. He concluded that "all other things being equal, the property law
system tends to resolve disputes by preferring wilderness destruction to
wilderness preservation."25
THE PUBLIC LAW OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Even if one subscribes to the view that the common law, for one
reason or another, ran out of gas by the time the proliferation of federal
environmental legislation began in the 1970s, it is difficult to deny the
important role the common law had in shaping the contours of the pollution
control laws. Most comprehensive treatments of the evolution of
environmental law begin with the common law as the first meaningful
stage of development. 6 Over time the nuisance doctrine developed into a
powerful means of regulating the environment, so much that Professor Bill
Rodgers observes in his environmental law treatise that:
There is no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in
comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and
technological abuse. Nuisance actions reach pollution of all physical
media-air, water, land, groundwater-by a wide variety of means.
Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and
municipal activity that today is the subject of comprehensive
environmental regulation ....
22. Id. at 521.
23. Id. at 534-35.
24. ld. at 548-49.
25. Id. at 520.
26. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 315 (1985).
27. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENvIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1 at 112-13 (2d ed. 1994).
20051
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Indeed, from the beginning of the twentieth century courts had
enjoined the operation of industries found to cause pollution of agricultural
land, enjoined facilities emitting noxious odors, and awarded damages
against manufacturing plants found to have polluted waters.28 Clearly,
therefore, by the time Congress turned its attention to air, water, and land
pollution in the early 1970s, the common law had established the causal
connections between pollution and environmental harm; between
environmental harm and economic injury, and endorsed the need for and
practical availability of remedies. The common law thus provided much-
needed legitimacy to the public law agenda for pollution control.
By contrast, the public law agenda for ecosystem management has no
common law roots. In 1993, when Vice President Al Gore's National
Performance Review called for federal agencies to support a "proactive
approach to ensuring a sustainable economy and a sustainable environment
through ecosystem management,, 29 there was absolutely no foundation
from which to begin, common law or otherwise. The case could have been
made that the initiative would be an extension of the Endangered Species
Act (ESA), which, after all, proclaims to be intended to "provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved."3  However, the ESA hardly enjoys
broad-based legitimacy, as it remains one of the most controversial of
environmental laws, and, in fact, its species-specific focus makes for a
rather clumsy ecosystem management framework.3'
In other words, the ecosystem management was left to building itself
from the ground up. At about the same time, though, our knowledge of
ecosystem dynamics and the fragility of some natural resource systems
began growing by leaps and bounds, making the case for an ecosystem
management initiative quite compelling. The landmark contributions in the
28. See, e.g., Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964) (holding that the
injunction for the strong and obnoxious odors from the sewage disposal plant was a nuisance);
Steifer v. Kansas City, 267 P.2d 474 (1954) (holding that the noxious and offensive odors from a
public dump was a nuisance); Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933)
(holding that the sewage disposal plant was a nuisance to a stock farm laying nearby); Whalen v.
Union Bag & Paper Co, 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913) (holding that the pollution unto the
stream created a nuisance).
29. Vice President Albert Gore's National Performance Review,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2004).
31. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Seven
Degrees of Relevance, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 156 (2000).
[Vol. 18
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field appeared in the mid-1990s, defining the basis and framework for
ecosystem-scale management of natural resources.32
For my purposes, however, the most important development was the
emergence of a branch of ecosystem management focused on the economic
value humans derive not from natural resource commodities such as timber,
or from recreational uses, but from ecosystem functions such as flood
control, pollination, thermal regulation, and storm surge mitigation-what
ecologists today call ecosystem services.33  Through enhanced
understanding of ecosystem service values associated with natural
resources, the case for ecosystem management took on a previously
unnoticed economic dimension. Given the relation between intact
ecosystems and the delivery of these economically important services, it
seemed to me and a few other lawyers at the time that the law ought to pay
attention to whether ecosystems are being properly managed to enhance
overall social wealth.34
Yet public legislation, so effective at combating air, water, and land
pollution, is faltering at the prospect of forming a coherent ecosystem
management regime, much less one with any focus on ecosystem service
values. In the ten plus years since Vice President Gore began the
ecosystem management initiative, not much concrete has happened.
Federal agencies, particularly the public land management agencies,
scrambled around for several years pronouncing their commitment to the
cause, thereby striking fear into the hearts of western land interests.35
But Congress has managed no more than to introduce a bill, the
Ecosystem Management Act of 1995, which did not even define ecosystem
management!36 Indeed, in a Law School casebook I co-author on the law
of ecosystem management, I had to conclude that, at best, "the ESA and a
32. See Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report for the Ecological Society of America
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665
(1996); R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27
(1994).
33. See NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
(Gretchen Daily ed., 1997).
34. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 887 (1997); J.B.
Ruhl, Valuing Nature's Services: The Future of Environmental Law?, 13 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 359 (Summer 1998). Since then, the most complete collection of legal work on ecosystem
services appears in Symposium. See James Salzman, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science,
Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 309 (2001). A similar collection of law symposium
papers on the topic is expected to be published from a symposium planned for spring 2006 at
Florida State University entitled The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services.
35. See Rebecca W. Thompson, "Ecosystem Management"--Great Idea, but What Is It,
Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (Winter 1995).
36. See Ecosystem Management Act of 1995, S. 93, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
2005]
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collection of other laws contain elements and programs that can explicitly
or implicitly be advanced toward developing ecosystem-level policies
designed to conserve biodiversity." 3 In short, ecosystem management law
is a cobbled-together body of law, if it can even be called that much.
My take is that ecosystem management finds itself in this fragmented
and stalled condition because, unlike the antipollution legislation, it had no
common law foundation on which to build its structure and legitimacy.
Perhaps out of arrogance, or ignorance, or the failure fully to appreciate the
importance of the common law to antipollution legislation, ecosystem
management legislation tried to leapfrog its common law formative stage,
and it has gained little traction as a result. The question is whether the
common law can overcome its reputation as having little meaningful to add
to the field and backfill a foundation for the public law of ecosystem
management.
FORGING A COMMON LAW OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
There is a basis for hope in this regard; there is hope for a common
law of ecosystem management to develop. For if any of the "lack of'
arguments about the common law ever did provide explanatory power for
understanding the state of the common law of ecosystem management in
the past, it retains none today. Rather, the common law has the capacity,
opportunity, and, I daresay, the present-day will to become an engine of
ecological intelligence within our legal system.
Each of the three arguments for explaining the absence of a common
law of ecosystem management, supported as they are by solid evidence in
the case law, nonetheless suffers from the same problem-each depends on
conditions exogenous to the common law, conditions that themselves
evolve and thus may over time alter whatever constraint they imposed on
the development of the common law in the past. In particular, each
argument ignores society's increasing base of knowledge about ecosystem
dynamics and the immense economic value of the ecosystem services they
provide, knowledge which, through its continuing development, could
substantially alter the calculus of the common law.
Many commentators before me have advanced the case that the
common law is profoundly adaptive.38 It may very well be that nuisance
37. JOHN NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND EcosYsTEM
MANAGEMENT 297-98 (2002).
38. See J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DuKE
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law was overwhelmed by industrial society, that the Public Trust Doctrine
was eclipsed by federal legislation, and that property law was heavily
influenced by our nation's boundless frontier mentality; but all those
conditions have changed. We know industrialization has harmed our
ecosystems, that federal legislation does not hold all the answers, and that
the ecological frontier, if anything, is vanishing. And we know much more
today than we did thirty years ago about ecosystem services. As Justice
Scalia acknowledged in Lucas, "changed circumstances or new knowledge
may make what was previously permissible [under common law] no longer
so '."39 Hence, there is no reason why the common law cannot make an
adaptive move to fill some of the gap in ecosystem management law.
So, what would be the organizing principles for the evolution of a
common law doctrine of ecosystem management? It is too easy to propose
that the common law simply reverse direction and place a "green thumb on
the scales of justice" in favor of protecting ecosystems in general, as
Professor Sprankling has suggested. 40 Nor will it get far if we simply point
out the objectives of ecosystem management and invite the common law to
have at it. There must be a concrete theme to motivate the interest and
action of private litigants and the courts, and that theme must have
dimensions fitting within the basic contours of common law doctrine and
institutions. This includes articulating a coherent statement of rights and
liabilities that are susceptible to analysis through commonly understood
and applied principles of proof of breach, injury, and causation, as well as a
remedial system that provides efficient and equitable outcomes. In other
words, the approach needs to be legally practical.
Unfortunately, the discipline of ecosystem management is for the
most part brimming with themes that are decidedly impractical for these
purposes. Its organizing principles include conserving biodiversity,
restoring naturalness, providing safe harbor for native species, and the
implementation technique of adaptive management. Impressive sounding
as these terms may be, they are square pegs to the common law's round
holes.
But against that grain, the ecosystem services branch of ecology holds
great promise for the common law. Most of ecosystem management is
devoted to keeping ecosystem functions healthy for the sake of ecosystems;
on the other hand, the study of ecosystem services is devoted to articulating
which ecosystem functions provide service values to humans that would be
L.J. 849, 916-20 (1996).
39. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (emphasis added).
40. See Sprankling, supra note 21, at 587-89.
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costly, but clearly necessary or desirable, to replace were they to degrade in
quantity or quality. Moreover, because ecosystem services are the product
of ecosystem functions, and ecosystem functions are the product of
ecosystem structure, it follows as a matter of economic theory that the
relevant ecosystem structure is no less than the "natural capital" necessary
for providing economically valuable services to humans. And this new
focus in ecology is producing a rapidly mounting body of research
attaching real numbers to ecosystem service values at local and regional
scales.
Recently, for example, researchers studying pollination services in
Costa Rica demonstrated that the conversion of land from forest to grazing
uses reduces the local populations of wild pollinator species enough to
diminish productivity of nearby coffee plantations by more than fifteen
percent, resulting in significant annual losses for a typical plantation.4' On
a larger scale, more than twenty years ago law professor Oliver Houck
demonstrated that the loss of coastal wetlands in Louisiana was costing the
state billions of dollars in lost ecosystem service values.42 The idea caught
on too late, as we now well know, but Louisiana several years ago
embarked on an "Americas Wetland" campaign to call attention to its
vanishing coastal wetlands, including a major push to gain federal
assistance by noting the economic consequences of having its "working
coastline" of oil rigs, ports, fishing villages, and New Orleans casinos
flooded by the combination of rising sea levels and falling coastline
levels.43 The bottom line: Ecosystem services are not about just birds and
bees-they are about money, and lots of it.
Armed with that core set of principles, it is remarkable how
straightforward an exercise it is to outline a set of common law rights and
liabilities that put ecosystem services into play as the essential fabric of a
new stage in the development of environmental common law. Every law
student learns the black letter doctrine of nuisance: one commits a nuisance
when his or her use of land unreasonably interferes with another person's
reasonable use and enjoyment of his or her interest in land.an Lawyers
41. See T.H. Ricketts, Tropical Forest Fragments Enhance Pollinator Activity in Nearby
Coffee Crops, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1262 (2003).
42. See Oliver Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and
Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1983).
43. See Hurricane Katrina Targets Louisiana-Nation 's Oils Supply, Economy Endangered,
http://www.americas wetland.com/article.cfin?id=286&cateid=2&pageid=3&cid=16 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005). See also Nature Destroys, But It Also Can Protect, THE ENVTL. F. 18 (2005)
(discussing the plans in a post-Katrina context).
44. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (7th ed. 1999).
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through the ages have had no problem agreeing that odors from a pigsty, or
fumes from a copper smelting plant, or chemical pollution of a lake or
stream are within the ballpark of nuisance so defined. Why should matters
be any different when one person's use of land severs the flow of
economically valuable ecosystem services to another person's use of land?
A thought exercise drawing from the pollination example can help
illustrate the spectrum of possibilities suggested:
A commercial apple orchard is situated between an industrial facility
on one side and a forested tract on the other. The owner of the apple
orchard has suffered a substantial decline in commercially marketable
apple production and can prove both the cause and the economic damage.
The alternative causes to consider are:
- Emissions from the industrial facility drifting into the orchard are
damaging the bark of the trees, causing them to decline in productivity.
- Emissions from the industrial facility drifting into the orchard are
blemishing the skin of a substantial percentage of the unripe apples,
causing them to be unmarketable.
- Emissions from the industrial facility drifting into the orchard leave
a residue on the apple tree leaves and interferes with photosynthesis,
causing the trees to decline in productivity.
- Emissions from the industrial facility drifting into the orchard are
deterring visits from wild pollinators residing in the forest tract habitat,
thus causing a reduction in successful fruit production.
- The owner of the forest tract cuts down all the trees to build a
shopping mall, eliminating that source of wild pollinator visits and thus
causing a reduction in successful fruit production.
The first two of these scenarios are classic fodder for nuisance claims.
To be sure, there may be much to resolve about questions of liability and
remedy, but these cases are squarely within the tradition of nuisance law.
The next two scenarios involve land uses that sever the flow of ecosystem
services to the orchard by interrupting the delivery of the service,
photosynthesis in one case and pollination in the other. If these causal
connections are proven, it is not clear why the common law would fail to
recognize them as cognizable causes of action in nuisance if it does
recognize the first two scenarios as such. Indeed, while the causes in the
first two scenarios are described in familiar terms-damage to tree bark
and blemishes on apple skins-in fact, the causal chain in those cases
results in the interruption of ecosystem functions that support the trees and
their production of unblemished fruit. Why should it matter that the cause
20051
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of the reduced fruit production was the chemical reaction of the pollutant
on tree bark or apple skin in the first two cases versus its effect on sunlight
or bees in the next two? Why treat any of the first four scenarios
differently?
The more difficult case is the fifth scenario, because the flow of
ecosystem services is severed at the source property through destruction of
the natural capital-the forest supporting the pollinators-rather than at the
benefited property through interruption of the service at the point of
delivery. But the end result is the same-the orchard produces less fruit. If
the orchard owner can prove that the reduced fruit production is due to the
loss of pollinators that once resided on the shopping mall tract, why would
that not be cognizable in nuisance?
The quick response might be that the conversion of the source
property from forest to shopping mall is not unreasonable, whereas
pollution drifting in from the industrial facility is. But that does not answer
the question, which was whether the orchard owner's case is actionable in
nuisance, not whether it would prevail. The termination of pollination is,
after all, interfering with the orchard owner's use and enjoyment of the
property. That opens the door to a nuisance claim, with the central
question being, as it is in most nuisance cases, whether the allegedly
wrongful behavior was unreasonable. Nuisance law is quite a thicket on
the question of what is unreasonable, but that is both the beauty and the
frustration of the common law. It is made for this kind of balancing
inquiry, which Justice Scalia described in Lucas as an
[A]nalysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands
and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the [landowner's]
proposed activities, the social value of the [landowner's] activities and
their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
[landowner] and the government (or adjacent landowners) alike.45
To be sure, it is not expected that every loss of natural capital should
be or would be branded unreasonable under this test. Some natural capital
is more critical than other natural capital, in that its degradation or
destruction leads to significant economic injury on other lands. But given
that we increasingly know where natural capital is located, where the
ecosystem services it produces flow, and the value of those services at
benefited properties, there is no reason why nuisance law in both its public
and private stripes could not sort through questions about whether the
destruction of natural capital, in discrete cases, is reasonable or not.
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-01 (1992) (citations omitted).
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Not far from where I live and teach in Florida, for example, one can
see quite palpable evidence of the importance of coastal dunes to the
mitigation of hurricane storm surge damage at inland locations. There is a
staggering difference in outcome between inland areas shielded by intact
dunes and those inland of coastal development that did not retain dunes.
On a far more devastating scale, surely the media coverage of Hurricane
Katrina, which repeatedly made the point that damage in New Orleans
would have been mitigated had the coastal wetlands not been so severely
degraded, has focused the nation's mind on the economic importance of
ecosystem services. Under Justice Scalia's nuisance balancing test, the
harm to the public resources and private property resulting from the
impaired dune and wetland systems unquestionably was severe, likely far
outweighing the social utility of development that destroyed the resources,
and the owners of prior intact dune and wetland areas were in the best
position to avoid the harm. Were those resources thus critical natural
capital, the destruction of which was unreasonable in relation to the
expectations of inland property owners whose homes and businesses are
now in splinters?
It is my belief that the common law is equipped to answer that
question and others like it. The fact that it has not, until now, attempted to
do so does not mean that it cannot, or will not have the opportunity, or
simply is against all notion of it. The only missing ingredient, until now,
has been the storehouse of knowledge ecologists and economists are
building about the value of ecosystem services. This is precisely the kind
of new knowledge, as Justice Scalia confirmed in Lucas, that can transform
the common law and "make what was previously permissible no longer
so." '46 As sovereigns and landowners become aware of this new knowledge
and begin to appreciate the cost imposed upon them when others sever the
flow of ecosystem services to their lands, they will sue in public and private
nuisance actions. Indeed, such a claim was initiated recently in federal
court with respect to the losses suffered in Katrina, alleging that those
responsible for the disruption of wetland processes are also responsible in
tort for the economic losses that followed.47 And when lawyers and experts
use this new knowledge to demonstrate to courts the cause of the injury and
the value of the services lost, the courts will award damages, injunctions,
46. Id. at 1031.
47. See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., Civ. A. No. 05-4161 (E.D. La)
(complaint filed Sept. 13, 2005) (alleging that oil companies' dredging of pipeline channels in
coastal wetlands tortiously degraded storm surge mitigation capacity).
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and other relief.48 And it will all seem quite mundane, because there will
be nothing about it that is out of the ordinary for the common law.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of environmental common law I have outlined is
radical in the sense that it rebuts long-held assumptions about the limits of
the common law in the ecological realm, but it is not as radical as many
advocates of a strong ecosystem management regime will desire. As
unwise as it has been to forget to consult the common law about ecosystem
management, it would be more unwise to expect or demand too much from
it. This is why I avoided amorphous models for developing common law
principles of ecosystem management, such as preserving "wildness," or
conserving "biodiversity," or even protecting "the fragile land system" as
such. Rather, my proposal comes at those goals from the other end-the
practical, economic end-by being grounded in the demonstrable economic
harms that flow from the degradation of natural capital and the ecosystem
services it produces.
Admittedly, any approach based on proof of economic harm will not
address all the instances in which sound ecosystem management principles
might point in the direction of resource protection. The degradation of
natural capital often is caused by the cumulative effects of dispersed and
diverse actions, and the resulting depletion of ecosystem services may be
distant in time or location. Causation will be difficult to prove in those
cases. And even when causation can be reliably demonstrated, damages
may be so diffusely distributed that significant transactions costs pose
serious obstacles to successful prosecution of a nuisance claim. More
broadly, it will not always be the case that a local or regional "fragile land
system" produces ecosystem services of any substantial economic value, in
which case the availability of a nuisance claim is a moot point. By no
means, therefore, am I suggesting that nuisance law, even were courts and
litigants enthusiastically to embrace my proposal, will fill all the gaps in
ecosystem management law.
48. For example, a Rhode Island court recently found that proposed filling of wetlands for
a residential subdivision would constitute a public nuisance based on evidence "as to various
effects that the development will have including increasing nitrogen levels in the pond, both by
reason of nitrogen produced by the attendant residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh
area which actually filters and cleans runoff." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, C.A., No. WM 88-
0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at 5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). This finding had the effect of
precluding a claim that regulation preventing the filling took the property without just
compensation. Id. at 5, 15.
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On the other hand, nuisance law also did not provide a complete
response to pollution, but nobody has suggested that nuisance law should
not have been pursued in pollution cases, or that it was unimportant to the
formulation of pollution legislation. Like pollution law, ecosystem
management law will employ a wide variety of legal instruments and
institutions. The point is that nuisance law can play an indispensable role
in the evolution of that larger body of law, and that it has been overlooked
at the expense of the ecological values we hope the law of ecosystem
management will help us sustain. Indeed, there is no reason to stop at
nuisance law in this regard, as a variety of common law tort and property
doctrines are aptly suited for evolution toward the new understanding of the
value of natural capital and the ecosystem services it produces.49 And
someday, perhaps, the developing body of law may coalesce into a
common law of ecosystem services, complete with its own specialized
cause of action.
Even so, it is best to take this renaissance one step at a time. At most,
therefore, I hope to have described a way for the common law of nuisance
to operate at the interface of ecology and economics, to provide a
foundation for public legislation and a forum for resolving private civil
disputes over the reasonableness of behavior. If this evolutionary step
accomplishes that much, it will have proven yet again how flexible and
powerful the common law still can be.
49. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 321 (2005)
(describing how common law doctrines such as water rights, navigation servitudes, and
customary rights could form background principles within the meaning of Lucas).
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